Wonders never cease
February 24, 2005 – one of those days that makes one proud to be a Canadian, for it is on this day that the Martin government finally and officially announced that Canada will not participate in the missile defence shield.
In less than two years, the country has been faced with as many monumental military-themed decisions the responses to which would prove to speak volumes about who we are as a people: our contribution, if any, to Operation Iraqi Freedom; and our participation in the Ballistic Missile Defense Shield. The last time the country was faced with such decisions probably came when Bush the Elder was assembling his coalition to evict Iraq from Kuwait. Before that, Canada likely hadn’t faced such a decision since we were asked to support our southern neighbours in Indochina, or perhaps farther back to whether we would contribute to the conflict in Korea.
Proponents of the missile shield, both foreign and domestic, have argued the case on many fronts: that terrorists may gain access to a missile and direct it at Canada or at the U.S. using Canadian airspace. There is a new world order out there, ya know. Terrorists no longer have to be state-sponsored. Everything has changed since 9/11. Yadda, yadda, yadda.
Cheerleaders for missile defense have also argued that if Canada doesn’t participate in the project, it will give up its sovereignty by, in effect, outsourcing the country’s defence to the U.S. The same crowd has maintained that Canada has been riding American continental defence coat tails for years now.
The argument has even been made, amazingly, that Canada should participate in the project for no other reason but to regain favour with the Bush White House after spurning George W. in his coalition (read: country)-building exercise on the Arabian Peninsula.
U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci wasted no time remarking on the decision, saying that he was perplexed over Canada's apparent decision to allow Washington to make the decision if a missile was headed toward its territory.
"Why would you want to give up sovereignty?" he asked quizzically. "We don't get it. We think Canada would want to be in the room deciding what to do about an incoming missile that might be heading toward Canada."
A day after the public announcement, and in the wake of Cellucci's confusion, Martin noted that he would expect the United States to consult with Canada before launching intercept missiles into Canadian airspace. Cellucci, however, maintained that Canada has abdicated its say over when and where intercept missiles are fired, and would be "outside of the room" when any such decision is made. It would, however, be interesting to see how such a decision would be made without Canada in the room, given the existence and recently expanded role of NORAD.
From the standpoint of U.S. relations, Martin's pronouncement was probably a hard one to make, particularly given Jean Chretien's decision to keep Canadian troops out of Iraq, and the prediction (i.e. hope) that Paul Martin would set a different, more positive tone with the White House. However, with a minority government serving an electorate said to be against the missile shield, and the NDP and Bloc sharing that sentiment; domestically, it was likely not a hard decision for Martin to make at all.
From a strategic standpoint, I suspect it was also an easy decision, and not because Canada will likely never be targeted by missiles because we are "so nice". Rather, the belief by many in the international intelligence and military communities that the next attack on the U.S. will likely come from a test tube, briefcase or shipping container is a far more plausible scenario than a rogue nation or terrorist group lobbing a multibillion-dollar long range missile at Toronto or Head-Smashed-In-Buffalo Jump, Alberta, or even New York City, for that matter.
If the United States put as much resources into ramping up security at various ports of entry throughout the U.S., it would likely go a lot further to ensuring the safety of that country than would pumping US$65 billion into a system that has thus far failed five of nine tests, passed four tests that some regard to have been only marginally challenging and realistic, and whose overall worth is a big question mark.
In other words, it may be easy for Martin to shrug off the threat of a missile being fired from a rogue nation and the U.S. not consulting with Canada before trying to intercept it, simply because the likelihood of it happening is slimmer than a fraction of a nanoparticle.
We did the right thing by staying out of Iraq. We have done the right thing by not participating in missile defence. Firstly, by entering the program we would have legitimized the far-out theory that having a terrorist group or rogue nation fire a missile into North American airspace is so real, that such a missile shield is absolutely necessary for our future survival. This is bunk.
Second, entering the program would legitimize the Bush Administration's abandonment of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which restricted such defenses as the missile shield on the theory that it would slow the nuclear arms race by maintaining a kind of standoff known as "mutual assured destruction."
Third, it would raise the spectre of the weaponization of space.
According to Cellucci, the White House doesn't get it.
Perhaps it should try harder.
R.G. McGillivray
http://www.rgmcgillivray.com/pages/1/index.htm
In less than two years, the country has been faced with as many monumental military-themed decisions the responses to which would prove to speak volumes about who we are as a people: our contribution, if any, to Operation Iraqi Freedom; and our participation in the Ballistic Missile Defense Shield. The last time the country was faced with such decisions probably came when Bush the Elder was assembling his coalition to evict Iraq from Kuwait. Before that, Canada likely hadn’t faced such a decision since we were asked to support our southern neighbours in Indochina, or perhaps farther back to whether we would contribute to the conflict in Korea.
Proponents of the missile shield, both foreign and domestic, have argued the case on many fronts: that terrorists may gain access to a missile and direct it at Canada or at the U.S. using Canadian airspace. There is a new world order out there, ya know. Terrorists no longer have to be state-sponsored. Everything has changed since 9/11. Yadda, yadda, yadda.
Cheerleaders for missile defense have also argued that if Canada doesn’t participate in the project, it will give up its sovereignty by, in effect, outsourcing the country’s defence to the U.S. The same crowd has maintained that Canada has been riding American continental defence coat tails for years now.
The argument has even been made, amazingly, that Canada should participate in the project for no other reason but to regain favour with the Bush White House after spurning George W. in his coalition (read: country)-building exercise on the Arabian Peninsula.
U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci wasted no time remarking on the decision, saying that he was perplexed over Canada's apparent decision to allow Washington to make the decision if a missile was headed toward its territory.
"Why would you want to give up sovereignty?" he asked quizzically. "We don't get it. We think Canada would want to be in the room deciding what to do about an incoming missile that might be heading toward Canada."
A day after the public announcement, and in the wake of Cellucci's confusion, Martin noted that he would expect the United States to consult with Canada before launching intercept missiles into Canadian airspace. Cellucci, however, maintained that Canada has abdicated its say over when and where intercept missiles are fired, and would be "outside of the room" when any such decision is made. It would, however, be interesting to see how such a decision would be made without Canada in the room, given the existence and recently expanded role of NORAD.
From the standpoint of U.S. relations, Martin's pronouncement was probably a hard one to make, particularly given Jean Chretien's decision to keep Canadian troops out of Iraq, and the prediction (i.e. hope) that Paul Martin would set a different, more positive tone with the White House. However, with a minority government serving an electorate said to be against the missile shield, and the NDP and Bloc sharing that sentiment; domestically, it was likely not a hard decision for Martin to make at all.
From a strategic standpoint, I suspect it was also an easy decision, and not because Canada will likely never be targeted by missiles because we are "so nice". Rather, the belief by many in the international intelligence and military communities that the next attack on the U.S. will likely come from a test tube, briefcase or shipping container is a far more plausible scenario than a rogue nation or terrorist group lobbing a multibillion-dollar long range missile at Toronto or Head-Smashed-In-Buffalo Jump, Alberta, or even New York City, for that matter.
If the United States put as much resources into ramping up security at various ports of entry throughout the U.S., it would likely go a lot further to ensuring the safety of that country than would pumping US$65 billion into a system that has thus far failed five of nine tests, passed four tests that some regard to have been only marginally challenging and realistic, and whose overall worth is a big question mark.
In other words, it may be easy for Martin to shrug off the threat of a missile being fired from a rogue nation and the U.S. not consulting with Canada before trying to intercept it, simply because the likelihood of it happening is slimmer than a fraction of a nanoparticle.
We did the right thing by staying out of Iraq. We have done the right thing by not participating in missile defence. Firstly, by entering the program we would have legitimized the far-out theory that having a terrorist group or rogue nation fire a missile into North American airspace is so real, that such a missile shield is absolutely necessary for our future survival. This is bunk.
Second, entering the program would legitimize the Bush Administration's abandonment of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which restricted such defenses as the missile shield on the theory that it would slow the nuclear arms race by maintaining a kind of standoff known as "mutual assured destruction."
Third, it would raise the spectre of the weaponization of space.
According to Cellucci, the White House doesn't get it.
Perhaps it should try harder.
R.G. McGillivray
http://www.rgmcgillivray.com/pages/1/index.htm
posted by RG McGillivray at 4:03 p.m.
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